South Yorkshire Times – Saturday 28 August 1943
Quebec
Quebec without producing anything as clear cut as Casablanca, for public consumption at any rate, probably marks the first milestone on the constructive victory policy which the Allies are now entitled to regard as necessary. There has been less than the usual irresponsible clamour for details about the deliberations, because the decisions must so obviously be left to “emerge in action” as the joint statement by President and Prime Minister puts it.
This fact was subsequently underlined by President Roosevelt and the only thing we can do about it is to get on with our respective jobs until time reveals to us what the British and American leaders have planned and concerted with such unanimity. When that day comes our knowledge of the events will probably be less up to date than that of our enemies, but we shall not begrudge them that privilege, as it is one which will bring in its train dire penalties and distracting responsibilities. From the fact that “the military discussions . . . turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China,” it would seem that the plans of the Allies are well abreast of their achievements and the wide strategy of the war is being developed with a controlled rhythm which bespeaks confidence and power.
Though it is dangerous to be dogmatic, it does not seem unreasonable to draw the inference that the Allied leaders have a pretty shrewd idea how long it will take to finish off the Western end of the Axis. Naturally this is a secret for the few, and even such a closely guarded estimate must be subject to many qualifying factors, but Quebec majestically took the more immediate issue in its stride, looking beyond to the final settlement of accounts in the East.
While the reference to the war against Japan partly explains the absence of Russian participation in the conference, much more has been made of this absence than the fact seems to warrant. Geographical amenities obviously precluded the presence of Premier Stalin himself, and political considerations no doubt bear on the question of delegation by the Russian leader of responsibilities of representation at a meeting of such weight and moment. A tri-partite meeting with Soviet Russia is envisaged in the Churchill-Roosevelt statement as a possibility which may be realised in addition to a further joint conference between British and American authorities before the end of the year.
In any case it may be presumed that Mr. Churchill already knows the mind of Premier Stalin sufficiently clearly on the essential problems which the Allies jointly have to face. Russian realism probably prefers to relegate further conferences to a time when certain necessary and practical preliminaries have been disposed of. One of these the Red Army is now busily engaged on; another almost certainly bulked large in the Quebec talks, though discreetly referred to among “decisions” to “be furnished to the Soviet Government.” In the official language of masterly understatement we must leave this decisio