III. CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN THE SOUTH PLANE DISTRICT, ESPECIALLY IN THE EAST SIDE THEREOF T0 AND on THE DAY or THE EXPLOSION
With a view to determining the point of origin and cause of the explosion it is of great importance that as much detailed information as possible should be forthcoming as to the history of the eastern portion of this district in respect of the prevalence of so-called ” gob ” fires, the presence of gas, and the nature of the dust in the roadways and at the face. Unfortunately, as is so often the case in respect of these lamentable disasters, most of those who would have been best fitted to have given detailed and authoritative information on these points, more particularly in so far as they bear on the conditions prevailing on the day of the explosion and immediately preceding it, were among the victims of the explosions
Gob fires had been known in the neighbourhood of the face fault for some time past, the first occurring in August 1906, at the face, right up against the fault in old 3f`s.stall.This fire was dug out.
A second fire occurred not far away from the first, viz. at the top side off the cross-gate out of 33´s level on the fault side, where some timber had been left (see Fig. 2)
A third fire occurred at old 121`s stall, still against the fault, and at a point which ·I mark A on the plan (Fig. 2). The existence of this fire was first discovered on November 20th, 1911, and when scouring roads were driven to it it was found that the fire had backed from the fault for a distance of eight yards into the goaf (gob). On the 20th January, 1912, a small explosion of gas occurred at this fire, slightly burning four men who were engaged in working at the face. The effect of this explosion on; the air was felt at the present 121´s stall, about 150 yards distant from the seat of _the explosion it frightened all the men in the district who came out.
The deputy, Springthorpe, said he saw fire on February 2nd, which_” broke out over the top of the bars that had been set to scour forward towards the fault.” This was-about two yards back from the fault and it was the top coal which caught fire which “had probably been packed in when the coal had been got out.” It was only a very small fire and Springthorpe soon put it out.
The +chargeman at this spot (Saunders, killed in the explosion) stated on April 10th that he had seen a ” flash over the pack ” about twenty to thirty yards away from where Springthorpe had seen the fire before. At this time the management were under the impression that the fire had been scoured out, and Saunders was in charge of the operations of “drawing off ” and stowing up the scouring roads in the neighbourhood. But on making an investigation, neither the under-manager nor the deputy could find any trace of the fire, though again later, on the 22nd or 24th April, they (Mr. Bridges and Springthorpe) got on top of the_ old scourings to a road where they were drawing off and we examined it to see if there was any fire, any heat, any gas, and found nothing.
It was previous to its being stowed up. We just found a little cap * in the top and the deputy and I went on perhaps twenty yards.” Mr. Bridges, however, told me that although he could not find it “there must have been some fire” in April. Eventually the road and gateway leading to it were stowed up, or rather I was informed that they had been stowed up. The temperature at the spot where the fire had been seen by Saunders was according to Springthorpe between 94 and 98° Fah at the time when Saunders made his statement. This spot was just about four yards from the airway side.
Mr. Wilson´s (HQM. Senior Inspector of Mines, and Acting Divisional Inspector for some months after the explosion on July 9th) evidence in respect of these fires is of interest. He stated
“There is no question about it that for a considerable time there has been heating in that area. It has been reported several times. I have been there ‘ at least twice myself …. The whole of that area has more or less gone by the name of 121´sg because the first sign of heating was found at 121´s ; it has got the name ever since. If a gob fire was reported to us it was reported as being in 12l´s whether it was on that side or the outbye side …. I have never seen any fire there, and I think only on one occasion was actual fire reported . . . that was on January 20, there was a slight explosion at that point somewhere near the fault (not far from the present No. 7 In the first instance there was a sign of heating in that area, it was dug out, there were- a lot of scouring roads dug in different directions to dig the fire out. There was a lot that are not on the plan, then it was found that the coal on the top side of the fault had got hot in addition to the loose material, that fault has a rise of four feet six inches, this road was driven at the top side of the fault to get at any heating of material on the top side. On the 20th January men had been working there, after the ordinary thickness of the seam had been taken out they were getting down the top portion of the seam as ripping, and part of this top coal over the timbers got on fire while four men were working at this. They noticed the hot material, and although they usually had water pipes laid on to attack these fires with, just at that time, unfortunately, the pipes were broken so that the water was not available. One of the workmen got a bucketful of water and threw it up in the ripping to put out the fire. There is not much doubt that there had been a small quantity of gas in the ripping, and throwing this water up had brought the gas down which ignited at the face.
“Later on on 10th April, another occurrence was reported, viz., that a man, a workman, Saunders-had seen flame. I went a day or two afterwards and saw Saunders in the place and asked him to tell me just what he saw, and where he was and how he was placed at the moment. He told me he had been stowing in this same place at the top side of the fault…. at the moment he was getting his `snack´ , sitting more or less on the edge of the fault with his back towards the fault, when lie heard a tremendous roar like cannons going off. He instinctively turned round to see what it was, and just as he turned he saw tongues of flame come out of the pack. He was the only man who knew anything about it; nobody else had seen any flame. I gathered from him that there had been a tremendous fall at the side of the fault, the place had collected gas, that the fire had not been put out, that there was fire somewhere in that area, that there was a fall in that cavity which brought down gas, possibly not a very large quantity, which ignited at some hot material, and, being under pressure, just forced itself out between the top of the pack and the roof.”
Coming down to the month of July, 1912, 1 find that the deputies in charge of the South District were:-
James Springthorpe, with Charles Prince as assistant in the morning shift
William Berry, with Frank Walton as assistant in the afternoon shift
Fred Richardson, in the night shift.
I find from an examination of the deputies´ report book (which was not in the form, prescribed by the Secretary of State) that ” Gob stink ” was reported in “`121’s old gate ” by one or other of the above-mentioned deputies on the following dates, the hours being the time of entering the separate reports :-
Friday, July 5th 6 pm 10 pm 12 midnight
Saturday, July 6th 6 am 1 pm 3 pm 10 pm
Sunday, July, 7th 6 am 2 pm 10 pm
Monday, July 8th 6 am 2 pm 2 pm 10 pm
But gas is not mentioned as being present on any or these days.
A good system of air sampling and analysis was in operation at the colliery, and the state of the mine air in various parts of the openings to the area affected by} the fire or incipient fire for some time prior to the explosion is shown by the following table
(Full Air Analysis included)
It is worthy of notice that the atmosphere at 121´s old gate had been ·depleted of nearly one-quarter of its oxygen, containing only 15`8 per cent., and showing also`2 per cent of carbon dioxide, clearly indicating considerable heating in the vicinity.
The first indication of the fire reported, was on Friday evening and_ during the whole of the week-end the management were engaged in combating this fire.
The meaning of the expression “gob stink in 121 old gate” needs some explanation. During the operations attendant on the extinguishing of the previously recorded fires in this district, old 125´s had been stowed up having acted as a ” smoke hole” or vent for the air carrying smoke into the return airway to the 33 level. Old 121´s then became the new smoke hole. It was in this road, therefore, that the smell of “gob stink” would, naturally be first detected. In order to elucidate the cause of the explosions which took place on the morning July 9th it is of the first importance that we should know exactly what was the scheme of operations devised by the management to deal with the fire, the exact position of which they did not locate, but which they shrewdly suspected was continuation of the previous fire whether such a scheme was carried out in its entirety, and, if so, the order in which it was carried into effect. I may here state that the plans submitted by the management at the Inquiry, purporting to show what roads had been stowed and the position of the stoppings in the neighbourhood of the fire were inaccurate, though satisfied myself the particulars shown were in accordance with the instructions, given by Mr. Chambers, but I do not think these instructions had been carried out in the order and manner intended by Mr. Chambers. Why the instructions had not been fully carried out I cannot say, Mr. Bury not being available to give evidence in the matter
Mr. Bury may have been able to advance some good reason for his action-to explain matters-or he may himself have been misinformed as to some points Which the inquiry has since made clear, or instructions given by him may not_ have been fully carried out. However that may be, failing my having heard him on the matter, I do not deem it right to criticise his actions in any way. He may have been to blame, or he may have been able to show that blame did not attach to him.
It is a curious fact that although Mr Witty was the Agent over the two collieries and Mr Bury was therefore under him, he had not received his instructions from Mr. Witty respecting the manner in which the fire should be dealt with. The instructions came from Mr. Chambers direct. Nor had Mr. Witty seen Mr. Bury since Sunday night.
Q. ” Did you discuss it (the situation) with him then”?-A. Yes. I simply asked what was being done.
Q. `What did he say?-A, He said he was carrying out his instructions-what had been arranged to do.
Q What had been arranged?-A. He said he was building stoppings in the part affected.
Q. Which was the part affected, and where were the stoppings put? A. They would be this side and there and there (indicated on plan put in by management). That done and all this part drawn off.
Q. Who made this plan? A. I had it prepared.
Q. Then have you seen those stoppings?-A. I do not know
Q, Mr. Bury had instructions to build certain stoppings?—A. Yes
Q. Were you the medium that transmitted that information?–A. No Sir.-
Mr. Chambers, who stated that he ‘kept in close touch with all the underground developments at the mine, said that he discussed with Mr. Bury the whole situation arising from the detection of the gob stink, and l asked him
” And you were more or less conversant with all the details ? ” A. Well not quite to the extent that has been disclosed now, because I saw him first and, discussed with him first on the Saturday morning…. he told me there had been a gob stink coming off old 121´s, that is from the seat of the old fire.
Mr Bury then explained to Mr. Chambers the position of the roads in the neighbourhood which appeared .to be as follows :>-Old 125`s was drawn out (this doesn´t necessarily that it was tight stowed), and a stopping built at the bottom end; old 121’s was drawn out and was being partially stowed; it was used as a vent, being open along the top for about one foot in height. Old 7´s was drawn out and was being stowed up.
The bent road in the neighbourhood of A was partially stowed up and the stowing was being continued, but not to the roof, a space being necessary in order to allow of the passage of air via the smoke hole, and so to ventilate the place where the men were stowing (in the bend).
Mr. Chambers then asked Mr. Bury what measures he was taking with a view to preventing the air getting in and towards stopping the heating. He replied that the heating was due to air percolating through fissures (through the breaking of the strata). Mr. Chambers said “You must stop that at once. I said rip this road (a road in the neighbourhood), and step off all the air going into this side as quickly as you possibly “can. I said stow this (indicating) and stop 7´s. He said we are drawing it off now, I said that is quite right. He said they were putting a pack in to stop the air getting along that thee (between 64´s and 7´s), along the fault side. Then I said when you have done that you must rip this (64´s) road, and gob it above and any` fissures you can find, and put small stuff on the floor and water it to exclude any air that might percolate through.
Q. ” The space between 64´s and 7´s? _” And 7´s, yes, to find out the best place he could exclude the air; there; I said when he had done that he was to rip this road and get it above any fissures or any place where air could percolate into that area. `When you have done that you are certain,´ I said.”
Q.” Your idea being to stop off the fresh air first from getting to where the fire ” might be so as to stop the fresh air getting at it, and then to stop up the exit from there_(the old roads in the fire area) ?”-A. ” Exactly”
Q. “Instead of the reverse way?”-A. ” That is right, instead of the, reverse way
Q “The reverse way, in your opinion, would be dangerous?”-A. I do not like that. I prefer to prevent it getting in, and do the egress afterwards.
That is as far as I got with him on the Saturday morning. I saw him on the Monday morning and asked him how he was getting on. He said he would be getting all the stoppings completed in the afternoon. I said, `How is the stink this morning?” He said, `It is no better.´ I said, `Is it any worse Pl He said, `No, it is about the same,´ ….. I said, `Do you think there is any indication of actual fire there?´ He said `No, just this parafiny stink. That is all
” I know up to the time I left (i.e. Mr Chambers left for Sunderland, where, he had some business to transact, on Monday).” I am of opinion that the directions given by Mr. Chambers were proper and such as would have prevented the disaster that took place on Tuesday morning had they been carried out in the order in which he intended them to be carried out. Asked whether he- thought that his instructions had been carried out, and he answered. I have every reason to believe he was trying to carry them out.”
Q. Do you think the order of procedure that you laid down was adopted absolutely?”-A. “Yes, I believe so, because at the stopping (in old 121´s) that was being put here, there was an electric lamp on it.”
I then put a question to him which I deem of the highest importance. I asked: ” Do you think that even supposing they (the instructions) were carried out in the order which you gave them, that they were carried out in their entirety : do you think that the air was effectively stopped off between 64´s and 7´s ?”-A. I have heard no contrary evidence. They have stated this stopping was put in this road, and that would exclude all air getting in that way as well as it could be effected until they put in a brick stopping. Whether that was built up or not I do not know. He did not tell me that.”
Q. Do you think there was a stopping built between 64’s and 7`s or do you think it was a dirt pack?”-A. “Springthorpe said There had been packing put on; they were drawing it out and they were putting a packing there.”
But he was not prepared to say whether it was tightly packed or not, not having seen it. I put it to him that ” If all exit, all escape, is cut off from gas generated upon they edge of the fault, by these stoppings in these three roads (old 125, 121 and old 7) and I the `stopping between t54°s and 7´s was not tight, you would have all the elements, or you might have all the elements, necessary to produce an explosion?
He said, Exactly. I think we must be pretty certain about this, that all the air was not excluded or else there would not have been an explosion but where it got in we cannot tell
Springthorpe was the deputy in charge of the morning shift in the South plane. His evidence was somewhat confused, and he seemed to be labouring under considerable V- I emotion. (He had lost a son in the second explosion.) He said the smell of gob stink was worse on the 6th than on the 5th, but on the 7th just about the same as on the 6th
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+ When a fire breaks out it is customary at this colliery to put an experienced workman or deputy in charge of the workmen engaged in combating it.
* Gas cap on the flame of the safety lamp.
The position, according to him, on Monday afternoon when he left the pit, was as follows
The stopping in old 125´s was completed;
I II A pack stopping had been put in 121´s old gate and outbye side of a brick stopping had been commenced but was not completed, and a stopping had been built in old 7´s
`According to him the only .men working at stopping in the district were those at 121ls old gate and those at new 7 s who were engaged in strengthening a pack stopping. No stopping had been put in on the left hand side of new 7´s up against the fault. He said, “it was- quite solid on the fault but I am very doubtful as to this being so in view of the evidence of Mr Wilson (see page 10), and bf what Mr. Chambers said in respect of fissures. He said also that the right-hand of 7´s stall was ” gob packed” so that an explosion could find no vent along the face there. I In answer to Mr. Smillie he said some of the ventilation was passing along the face of 64,s and, coming; out past the end of 7Is until the pack was put on and that the pack ” could be finished, I “I think, on Monday afternoon.” I The face of Gals was, however, being worked on Monday, and the South District work book (which was recovered from the Mine by an exploration party on August 20) points to men being engaged in building a pack in 64´s on Monday night, as will be seen from the following extract
Monday night July 9th, 1912.
Packs.-Rowell 64. Rodgers 121
Turning.-12, 19, 143, 153.
Contract.-Roodhouse 19 Level
Datalling-Burns and Gordon ripping below 64 Turn.
Evans, driving. Denton, gobbing 7 old gate
Walsh_ and Helmsley repairing 64 gate for pack.
Boycott and Mulrooney repairing 19 gate top side door.
J. W. Thompson and J. Fletcher cleaning 121 gate.
Hunt driving for 121 packing.
Marsden, Chapman and G. Hindson repairing 12´s gate.
Humphries and Walsh relaying S.W. Level
W Dove ripping bottom 121 gate.
121 Scouring-Beach and C. Fletcher and Godsmark bricking two scouring,
Frankland driving bricks and mortar from bottom cross gate.
I will show later on that there must have been an air road connecting the face of 64’s and 7’s
I show on figure 2 by dotted lines the position of the stopping in 7s gate supposed by the management to have been erected, but shown, at the Inquiry not to been put in. `
So far as can be determined no notice of the indications of heating was sent by the Manager to Mr. Pickering. Miss Martin, Mr. Pickering´s clerk, said she had seen none, though the Order of the Secretary of State under the Notice of Accidents Act requires that all underground fires shall be reported to the Inspector.
The evidence of the several witnesses satisfied me that the place was in a more or less dangerous condition from the presence of “stythe,” and possibly fire damp also, and heat.
In asking Mr. Smith whether he was going to call any more evidence to prove the state of that place, I said “I think it was in a very bad state. That is clear. . There is no doubt about that.” Mr. Gichard, who represented, the owners, said “I think I have indicated my position by asking this witness (Barnbrook) no questions.
Mr Smith.-” The only point is this; the men were allowed to work in these places under these conditions.”
Myself.-” I have noted the fact of the conditions
Mr Smith. All these shifts are run concurrently down this area, These people were working up here, and the only point is whether they should have been allowed to work.”
Myself- “That is a point for the Court. The facts that the last three witnesses have brought forward are not in dispute. The representatives of the management have asked no questions
It is quite clear to me, as I stated, that the place was dangerous, but it was necessary in the interests of safety, that the stoppings should be put in with all possible despatch; care however should have been taken to see that the ” intake” to the fire area was stopped before the “return” side, and no persons other than those engaged in putting in the stoppings should have been allowed to work in the district until the `areai in question had been completely isolated.
I took the evidence of four men who were engaged in working in the old roads in the neighbourhood of the fire which was `being stopped of, namely Thomas Slater
, Edward Dove, William Barnbrook and George Ackroyd.The evidence of these witnesses points to the condition of the atmosphere at this point for the few days preceding the explosion being exceedingly bad, and it was on account of the foulness of the atmosphere that they were provided by the management with electric lamps. The heat also,”was very considerable. Barnbrook said that on the Sunday night whilst engaged at work at the stopping in old 121´s “I came to the mouth of the slit; I was giving a lamp to a fellow workman to come in. I gave him a lamp. I remember nothing else; I was unconscious
On Monday afternoon whilst working in 121´s and getting the place ready for the second brick stopping, another man was rendered unconscious. Barnbrook said, in answer to Mr. Herbert Smith, that he was “sent by the deputy round to old 7’s where they were drawing off …… I was sent round to see how they were going on, where they were drawing. I met them between G4´s and 7´s. They were sitting down having a rest. They said it was very hot. Of course I took my message the deputy sent, and I went back. When I got back the deputy said whose turn was it in. l said
“I did not know, very likely it was mine. He said there was a man in it already! As the man came out he fell unconscious. The deputy and another fellow and me carried him out and brought him round, and the deputy said we will have a look and bring the tools out, we have had enough, and I said I thought so.
This was about 9 o´clock on Monday night. The witness had had experience working at the last fire in the neighbourhood.
As to the atmospheric conditions prevailing at the time of the fire, a short time precedent to the explosion the automatic chart of the barometric pressure on the 8th July shows a steady rise from 29.74 inches to 29.90 inches and for the 9th a continued rise from 29.90 to 30.00 inches. The following are copies of the entries in the record book kept in the managers office:
July 8th (6 a.m.) 29.80 – Thermometer 59 deg F H.C.
July 8th (2 p.m.) 39.90 – Thermometer 76 deg F E.C.
July 9th (6 a.m.) 29.95 – Thermometer 50 deg F H.C.
Hygrometric readings were not taken at that time, nor was the state of weather noted.